The Highest Breed Essay Example for Free

The Highest Breed Essay How would you like to own a car that can run and transport you on the road for ten minutes without the engine turned on? (Gold, 2006) No, it won’t be on neutral and without speed control†¦ you simply have to be on a Toyota Hybrid vehicle. This is because when the car isnt using its gasoline engine, such as when you are in bumper to bumper traffic or coasting downhill, it shuts the engine off automatically. Isn’t that neat? That means that you are not burning gas (and your hard-earned money with it) as much as you would have on a conventional car. When you are not burning gas, you too are helping to preserve the earth from global warming. You might want to join the thousands of people who are already seeing the importance of clean air and financial savings just by driving a cool car. Today, I take it upon myself to show you why Toyota Hybrid vehicles, especially the Prius, are the absolute choices for economical and environmental reasons, especially when compared to conventional gasoline-powered cars and other hybrid brands. Global warming is a very urgent issue because it affects the survival of every creature on earth. Global warming happens when carbon and methane gases are excessive and form a sort of force field in the atmosphere. (Mendoza, 2005) This additional layer of smog blocks the heat from the earth from escaping the atmosphere and thereby causes the unnecessary warming which can alter natural weather cycles, etc. How can individuals like us help maintain clean air without sacrificing too much time, effort, and comfort? The answer lies within Toyota Hybrid vehicles. Toyota has been a pioneer in making environmentalists’ dreams come true on the road to zero emissions by coming out with the first mass-produced hybrid car in 1997 – the Prius. In eight years, the Prius has already sold 1,000,000 cars and is 9th best selling car in the US for 2007. (Vlasic, 2008) The Prius is a vehicle run by a battery but has an electric motor and a petrol-powered engine. This means that during stop lights and downhill stretches, the car is simply run by the battery and will only use gas upon the need for higher speed. Ergo, approximately 3. 5 million fewer tons of carbon dioxide had been saved by these cars in the short span of time. (Mendoza) This not only means less pollution but also less need to buy gas. When it comes to fuel efficiency, the Prius is also above its competitors. Compared to a Honda Civic Hybrid which goes about 42 miles per gallon (MPG), for example, the Prius can take the distance to 47 MPG. This means that if you consume $1007 worth of gas on a Civic, you will only be spending $902 on a Prius. This is even more dramatic when compared to the $1650 you would have spent on an ordinary gas-powered car. (Comparison Chart, 2007) Other hybrid models like the Camry and Highlander are also gaining popularity in the market. The Camry is not as fuel efficient as the Prius but is known for its Plasmacluster ionizer which filters micro dust and pollen so you can have clean air inside and outside of the car. The Camry’s battery is also good for 8 years compared to Honda Altima’s 5 years which means it can run longer by about 40,000 miles. The Highlander, on the other hand, is incomparable to the sedans because it is much largely built and therefore requires more power. However, it is preferable to the other hybrid midsize SUVs because of its 241 horsepower compared to the others which can only go up to 208 hp. Toyota, as anyone can see, has been a good pioneer and maintains to be the best in the hybrid industry. Toyota hybrids are above par in fuel efficiency, cost of maintenance, speed, comfort and cleanliness with regards to its emissions. Every responsible citizen who wants to help maintain economic and environmental balance simply has to own one†¦don’t you think so too? If you are thinking of getting a new car or is at least concerned in keeping the earth in proper temperature, please do consider Toyota hybrid vehicles. Trust me, you won’t regret it.

Natural Necessity, Objective Chances and Causal Powers :: Philosophy Philosophical Essays

Natural Necessity, Objective Chances and Causal Powers ABSTRACT: Are the relations between the property of a thing and its related disposition to react in certain ways, and between the triggering of that disposition and the consequent effect, necessary? Harrà © and Madden, in their analysis of causal powers, said they are, but their arguments are not persuasive. Humeans like Simon Blackburn deny it. I criticize the Humean position, and argue afresh for their necessity. I note that David Lewis' analysis of causation requires their necessity, though as a confessed Humean he has not admitted this. There is an interesting convergence among several recent theories of causation. They describe causes as events of a kind which increase the objective chance of events of other kinds, which are their effects. The theories I have in mind are those of David Lewis (1986, 1994), D.H. Mellor (1995), and Peter Menzies (1996). They attribute various other properties to causes, but all agree that this is an important and necessary fact about them. Thus, dropping a crystal wine glass onto a hard floor can be said to have caused it to shatter because it increased the probability of its shattering at that time, since whenever a piece of crystal glass is struck by a hard object, it will very probably shatter. Such generalizations relating cause and effect can be understood as being true of something because of one of its properties. For instance one can say: if something has the molecular structure of crystal glass, then if it is hit by a hard object it will very probably shatter. The generalization relating cause and effect can then be seen as a disposition of the thing whose property makes it true. In this case it amounts to saying that things which have the molecular structure of crystal glass are fragile. More generally, the generalizations involved in causation are of the following form: if something has a certain property, then if it comes into a certain relation with something else, it will result in another event, with a certain objective probability. Call this generalization [G]. This generalization looks very much like the analysis of causal powers offered by R.Harrà © and E.H. Madden (1975). They defined the causal power of a thing in terms of its disposition to behave in certain ways in certain circumstances because of its nature. They wrote: "'X has the power to A' means 'X will or can do A, in the appropriate conditions, in virtue of its intrinsic nature' (p.

Models of decision making Essay

When we speak of rational behavior, we should remember that our focus in this discussion is not on making decisions, but rather on how to support the process of making decisions. Managers are change agents, not just decision makers, so the steps before and after a decision are as important as the actual choice of action. Preparatory steps include creating tension for change, understanding the positions of the various constituencies, and developing political support for a chosen action. Steps after the decision include naming the change monitor and identifying the monitoring methods. Therefore, the mission of good information system is broader than just collecting data to make a choice. Designers of information systems must understand not only how managers think but also how the decision process will be implemented in the managers’ environment. An information system that is well design is an information system that is used. Thus, an information system, in order to be useful, must be implemented. To understand the implementation process better, we review three models of organizational decision making rational, administrative, and political. The Rational Model. The rational model of decision making was introduced earlier in this chapter. It is based on the logic of optimal choice: the choice that would maximize value for the organization. The manager is assumed to be an objective, totally informed person who would select the most efficient alternative, maximizing whatever amount and type of output s/he values. We can summarize the rational choice process as follows: 1. An individual is confronted with a number of known alternative courses of action. 2. Each alternative bears a set of possible consequences. These consequences are known and are quantifiable. 3. The individual has a system of preferences or utilities that permits him or her to rank the consequences and choose an alternative. There is no empirical support for the contention that these three phases are actually used. In reality, managers seldom have the time or money to analyze all alternatives or envision all consequences. If rationality were ever-present among members of an organization, the organization would appear as a coherent and rational  policy-making entity that maximizes the attainment of a unique set of goals and has no internal conflicts. In other words, a rational decision process implies a rational organization. A rational organization is an organization that has (1) centralized power, (2) harmony and consistency of goals across boundaries, and (3) members who are objective, fully informed, and inclined to choose alternatives that maximize the common good of the organization. The rational model represents a sanitized vision of how organizations make decisions. In reality, organizations often seem more like complex groups of coalitions fighting for shares of limited resources, and using multiple sources of information with varying reliability to achieve a set of fluid goals. Individuals within organizations typically have widely divergent perceptions and goals and act to maximize their own gains, not necessarily those of the organization. Because of this disparity between the rational model and reality, we prefer to accept the rational model primarily as a benchmark for comparing the remaining two organization decision-making processes. In searching for a more realistic description of how organizations make decisions, we turn to the satisficing, or administrative, model. The Administrative Model. The quest for a more realistic description of organization decision making produced a variation called the administrative model. This model sees decision makers as people with varying degrees of motivation who are besieged by demands but have little time to make decisions and thus seek shortcuts to find acceptable solutions. Under the administrative model, a decision maker does not try to optimize but instead â€Å"satisfices† treats objectives as loose constraints that can tighten if there are many acceptable alternatives that fulfill those constraints. While optimization would require choosing the alternative with the highest value, satisficing requires finding the first alternative with an acceptable value, that is, an alternative with a value above a minimally acceptable level on a given constraint. Assume you had a car you wanted to sell. If you listed your car for $2,500 and had 10 offers, you could choose with either method. With the rational method, you would determine which offer had the highest value in terms of conditions and price. With the satisficing model, you would accept the first offer that met your lowest acceptable price. Satisficing may lead to a reduced decision quality, but it saves time and effort. Satisficing is a dynamic construct: the aspiration levels of the manager and the number of alternatives determine what is a â€Å"feasible, good enough solution.† It has been pointed out that satisficing is an appropriate (i.e., rational) strategy when the cost of delaying a decision or searching for further alternatives is high in relation to the expected payoff of the supposedly superior alternative. When you take into consideration the costs related to extended search, it is questionable whether the optimum procedure is to search for the optimum value. When a decision has been reached and the solution to the problem implemented and found to be acceptable, then the organization institutionalizes the procedure used to solve the problem into astandard operating procedure (SOP). SOPs are rules, programs, and routines that are invoked by managers to gain time and to avoid the task of solving a problem from scratch each times it appears. Sometimes managers invoke those SOPs when the organization is facing a similar but not identical problem to the one that the SOP originally solved. Since SOPs are often processes that worked once but nobody is quite sure why or whether it was the best way to solve the original problem in the first place. SOPs are not always the time-savers they are supposed to be. Once implication of having rationally bounded decision makers in organizations is that organizations cannot be seen as single entities. Rather, problems are broken down and assigned to specialized units within the organization that develop their own priorities and goals. These goals, sometimes termed subgoals, may not agree with the organization’s overall goals. This phenomenon has been called local rationality.3 Using the perspective, organizations could be viewed as constellations of loosely allied units, each having a set of SOPs and programs to deal with its piece of the problem. As time passes, these units become more distinct and their subgoals more entrenched. These divergences are enhanced by increasingly distinct perceptions of priorities, information, and uncertainty; they are further reinforced by recruitment, rewards, and tenure. When these tendencies are very strong, the loose alliance of organization units breaks down into â€Å"organized anarchies.† In the extreme case, coalitions are created with conflicting interests. This leads us to the political model of rationality. You should note that the term political does not imply that this model is only relevant in the public  (government) sector; rather the term applies to a type of organization that may exist in any industry or industry sector. The Political Model. In contrast to the rational model, players in the political model (often referred to as incrementalists) do not focus on a single issue but on many intraorganizational problems that reflect their personal goals. In contrast to the administrative model, the political model does not assume that decisions result from applying existing standard operating procedures, programs, and routines. Decisions result from bargaining among coalitions. Unlike in the previous models, power is decentralized. This concept of decision making as a political process emphasizes the natural multiplicity of goals, values, and interests in a complex environment. The political model views decision making as a process of conflict resolution and consensus building and decisions as products of compromise. The old adage, â€Å"Scratch my back and I’ll scratch yours,† is the dominant decision-making strategy. When a problem requires a change n policy, the political model predicts that a manager will consider a few alternatives, all of them similar to existing policy. This perspective points out that decisions tend to be incremental— that managers make small changes in response to immediate pressures instead of working out a clear set of plans and a comprehensive program. This incrementalist approach can be seen as the simplest or most extreme form of satisficing. The incremental approach of the political model allows managers to reduce the time spent on the information search and problem definition stages. Incremental decision making is geared to address shortcomings in present policy rather than consider a superior, but novel, course of action. In the political model, the stakeholders have different perception, priorities, and solutions. Because stakeholders have the power to veto some proposals, no policy that harms a powerful stakeholder is likely to triumph even if it is objectively â€Å"optimal.† Our purpose in reviewing these models of organizational decision making is to highlight the realities of decision making that must be recognized when developing or acquiring information systems. If the designer of an I/S assumes that the rational model is a valid representation of the way a given organization is being managed when in fact the political model is a more valid description, s/he may encounter serious implementation  problems. For example, access to information can be very sensitive issue, since in politics, â€Å"information is power.† If managers discover that once a new information system is implemented they will no longer have access to certain data, it is quite possible they will resist the implementation effort. When we consider the issue of organizational decision making, it is important to recognize that the structure of the organization has a strong influence on how and when information is communicated and who gets involved in what decisions. We now turn our attention to the issue of organizational structure.

Merger Analysis Essay Example For Free At Magic Help - Free Essay Example

Sample details Pages: 8 Words: 2411 Downloads: 4 Date added: 2017/06/26 Category Business Essay Type Analytical essay Tags: SWOT Analysis Essay Did you like this example? Mergers and acquisitions have long been an established form of corporate development to increase the strength of a business in an array of areas. The logic behind the Daimler and Chrysler merger was obvious, with Neubauer et al (2000) elaborating that it would potentially make the company an automobile powerhouse internationally and not just in mainland Europe. Furthermore, both companies felt that they were individually too small to challenge on a global scale in the long term. Don’t waste time! Our writers will create an original "Merger Analysis Essay Example For Free At Magic Help" essay for you Create order Chrysler were in agreement and believed the merger would generate enhanced prosperity. In 1998 Daimler paid $38 billion to takeover Chrysler in a horizontal merger (The Economist, 2000). The advantages of such a formidable merger are massive, with Gaughan (2007) believing that the primary benefits of a merger are synergy, value creation and competitive advantage. The merger of Disney and Pixar has symbolised these benefits with Barnes (2008) indicating that since 2006 Disneys stock rose by 28% in 2008 and revenue streams have continued to increase substantially. The two firms adopted a united approach, utilizing their expertise to increase the quality of their products. With Daimler ranked 17th and Chrysler 25th globally in 1988, the amalgamation would undoubtedly boost the value of the combined company, whilst also exploiting economies of scale which would allow the company to maximise profits, increasing share value. The sum of the whole was anticipated to be greater than the two p arts. The merger was claimed to be a merger of equals where the expertise and knowledge of the two companies would be combined to forge high quality marketable products. In reality this was not the case with Daimler thrusting their authority over Chrysler by installing German executives into senior positions within Chrysler. The scale of the failure of the DaimlerChrysler merger was illustrated when Daimler sold Chrysler to Cerberus for $7.8 billion in 2007, an astounding loss on what they had invested for Chrysler. Jensen and Ruback (1983. P.43) stated that on average target shares increase in price from 16% to 30% around the date of the tender offer. This does offer reasoning for why Daimler incurred such a loss. However, the issues are much more complex than this simple explanation. Jensen and Ruback (1983) believed such direct action was critical for corporate control. Sudarsanam and Mahates (2006) research would support this claim as they identified that hostile takeovers in nature tended to produce higher returns than a friendly takeover. From this aspect such a strong action was recommendable to achieve control. Johnson and Scholes (2000) believed a SWOT analysis was an effective method isolating the opportunities gained from a merger. Indeed such an analysis portrayed that the merger would allow massive market power growth, value creation and competitive advantage. A SWOT analysis in regards to the merger has been created below to illustrate the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of the merger. Daimler and Chrysler Merger SWOT Analysis Strengths Savings through economies of scale Large corporate brands Increased capital strength Competitive advantage through size Weaknesses Difficult to control and direct such a large organisation Two diverse cultures (European American) to infuse Different customer bases Opportunities Entry into new markets (Particularly Asia) and market expansion Innovation through combined expertise Potential to become a dominant market leader Threats Such a large merger can be high risk to the existence of both companies Newly formed DaimlerChrysler lacks any corporate identity, customers may not align with it Cultural Differences Matsumoto (1996, p.16) defined culture by stating that culture is the set of attitudes, values, beliefs and behaviours shared by a group of people, but different for each individual, communicated from one generation to the next. In contrast to the thought of Jensen and Ruback (1983) the ousting of management violated the long established culture within Chrysler, which in turn was the catalyst for the cataclysmic failure that was the DaimlerChrysler merger (Neubauer et al, 2000). Employees resisted the European style which caused great conflict and tension between the two organisations. Incidentally, this compromised the communication process, resulting in poor products and disappointing sales in relation to the size of the merger. Pritchett (1997, p.7) identified a failure rate of 61% in acquisition programs, with failure defined as not earning a significant return. This was very much the case for DaimlerChrysler, with the BBC (2000) reporting a record low share price of $42.79 fro m a high of $108 in 2000 for the company. Just two years into the merger performance was plummeting. The BBC (2000) also revealed that in contrast the merger of equals the Daimler chairman, Jurgen Schrempp actually viewed Chrysler as a division of Daimler and not as a partnership. As eluded to above, Schrempp directed Chrysler as a European company by replacing Jim Holden, the Chrysler president with Dieter Zetsche. Forcing this European style programme of change was greatly contested and fuelled disengagement from staff at Chrysler. Through Scheins (2010) theory of The Organisational Iceberg it is clear to isolate culture as an area which can be one of the most challenging barriers to introducing change. Schein (2010) attributed culture as part of the informal organisation which influences values, beliefs and conflict. If this is not confronted then attempt to integrate change will become extremely difficult (Senior and Swailes, 2000). Gertsen et al (1998) proposed that this fierce resistance to change was due to the fact that employees emphasise cultural differences to demonstrate their distinctiveness and social identity. Hofstedes (2002) Cultural Dimensions Theory found that culture within different organisations was influenced by which country they resided in. He developed the dimensions of national cultures which consisted of the power distance index, individualism versus collectivism, uncertainty avoidance index, masculinity vs femininity, long term orientation versus short term orientation and indulgence versus restraint. Hofstede (2002) found that these dimensions all varied in organisations depending on what their national identity was. From this it is clear to appreciate the huge problem of attempting to amalgamate a European and an American culture as there are so many variables. Daimler was very rigid and bureaucratic with Chrysler in contrast being much more informal. Daimler and Chrysler by their very cultures were incompatible, stressing the need for an effective change management programme. Haslam and Ellemers (2005) believed that there was positive correlation between the level of employees social identification towards the organisation and performance. It is apparent that a key reason for DaimlerChryslers drop in share price in 2000 was due to many of Chryslers employees seeing little association with themselves and their counterparts of Daimler. The companies in isolation varied in so many ways. For instance Daimler had a brand image of being a high end luxury brand while Chrysler was a low end cars and trucks manufacturer. These contrasts meant defining the very identity of the merger was plagued by paradoxs which meant both employees and customers failed to connect to DaimlerChrysler. Daimler had instilled a great emphasis on the operational and business synergies of the merger, seemingly ignoring the implications of culture. Human Resource Management The investment decision is one that is integral to any success of the allocation of capital by a company. Pike et al (2012) stated that the investment decision is the decision to commit the firms financial and other resources to a particular course of action. With culture being the predominant factor of the DaimlerChrysler mergers demise, the HRM policies of the chairman at any given time were equally responsible. Daimler had envisioned lucrative rises in profit yet they failed to invest in a strategic human resource management process which would introduce the desired change in an effective manner (Gaughan, 2005). Schuler and Jackson (2001, p.239) attributed the importance of HRM to the interpretation that companies today need to be fast growing, efficient, profitable, flexible, adaptable, future ready and have a dominant market position. HRM is critical to implementing these factors which the DaimlerChrysler merger had lacked greatly, providing evidence as to why in the 21st cent ury specifically that they crumbled. The transition of management and integration must be done in a systematic and people orientated approach (Schuler and Jackson, 2001). The HR issues associated with mergers can be categorised into two unique phases; Pre-Merger: Involves an analysis of the cultural differences and other issues such as the impact on employee morale. This stage reinforces the need for human resource planning as such an analysis would demonstrate major challenge. Solutions to such difficulties would be to modify the recruitment and development process whilst introducing specific appraisal systems. The protracted difficulties would be allocated an effective change management plan by the HRM department. However, Daimler critically undervalued this crucial aspect of a potential merger, which would have long term effects as explained. Post-Merger: The reality of the impact of the merger on HR related areas is revealed at this stage. The diverse HRM practices can uns ettle staff, with Chryslers staff resenting the European style of management, resulting in high levels of intransigence. Such emotional reaction diverts staff focus away from productivity, contributing heavily to laboured performance. The workshops devised by Daimler were not extensive enough to combat the massive cultural gap. It is imperative that strategic HRM is implemented to adjust a companys HRM strategy to that of the business strategy. For example Cisco has a culture constructed around risk taking and ambition. If they find that a protracted merger does not embody these values then they will refuse to force their culture on to a company, abandoning the prospect of the merger, such is the scale of problems which culture can present. There was also serious contemplation of separate headquarters such was the dismal level of communication between the two firms. Directions need to be from a centralised power source who is respected with Handy (1993) suggesting that this was t he ideal way to assume control and maintain effective decision making. Chryslers flat structure when compared to Daimlers hierarchical structure made it extremely difficult to initiate any HRM directives as both companies had different ways of doing so. The post-merger stage caused unprecedented difficulties for the merger as a result of little pre-merger analysis being undertaken. The cross-cultural differences were allowed to manifest into a massive concern with both Schrempp and Zetsche underperforming in their roles as chairmen of the merger. They distinctly did not commit their resources to developing training programmes which would have aided the alignment of Chryslers staff to that of the overall vision of Daimler. Tannenbaum and Yukl (1992) firmly contested that staff training was an area which should be reviewed regularly to ensure staff are being trained in accordance with the strategy of this business. Daimler did initiate HRM policies, but there was a lacking in depth. R egular staff appraisals and cross cultural learning days would have been methods of narrowing the gap between culture (Tannenbaum and Yukl, 1992). Conclusion From analysing the development and subsequent failure of the DaimlerChrysler merger it is abundantly clear that HRMs involvement in the change management process is integral. To overcome cultural issues, a tailored strategic HRM policy must be implemented such is the formidability of cultural factors. Daimler failed to realise just how potent the resistance of change can be and that as explained, originates from the informal structure of a company. It is undeniable that the Daimler and Chrysler merger had the potential to dominate the automobile industry due to their individually established size and profit margins. However, it was a mammoth failing as the two companies in reality were never able to amalgamate into a single corporate identity. AOL and Time Warner was a similar failing with the $164 billion deal eventually resulting in Warners stock diving by 80% (Bewkes, 2010). AOLs problem was that they did not anticipate that wireless internet and other relevant technology would revolutionise the broadband industry. They failed just like Daimler to analyse their threats and assess whether such a merger was of value. The Daimler and Chrysler merger was only a failure because Daimler underestimated the power that culture can forge. Strictly speaking, the merger for both companies was disastrous due to the stark culture gap, but equally so, this challenge was not managed effectively by the relevant departments. Perhaps the collapse of this huge merger can be embodied by Daimlers chief of passenger cars, Juergen Hubbert who is quoted as saying we have a clear understanding: one company, one vision, one chairman, two cultures (The Economist, 2000). Reference List Barnes, B. (2008) Disney and Pixar: The power of the prenup. The New York Times. [Online] Available from: https://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/01/business/media/01pixar.html?pagewanted=all_r=0 BBC. (2000) DaimlerChrysler shares hit new low. [Online] Available from: https://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1090975.stm Bewkes, J. (2010) AOL merger was the biggest mistake in corporate history, believes Time Warner chief Jeff Bewkes. Telegraph. [Online] Available from: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/mediatechnologyandtelecoms/media/8031227/AOL-merger-was-the-biggest-mistake-in-corporate-history-believes-Time-Warner-chief-Jeff-Bewkes.html Gaughan, P.A. (2005) Mergers: What can go wrong and how to prevent it. New Jersey: John Wiley Sons, Inc. Gaughan, P.A. (2007) Mergers, acquisitions and corporate restructurings. 4th ed. New Jersey: John Wiley Sons, Inc. Gertsen, M.C., Soderberg, A.M. and Torp, J.E. (1998) Cultural dimensions of international mergers and acqui sitions. Berlin: De Gruyter. Handy, C. (1993) Understanding organizations. 4th ed. England: Penguin Books. Haslam, S.A. and Ellemers, N. (2005) Social identity in industrial and organizational psychology: Concepts, controversies and contributions. International review of industrial and organizational psychology, 20 (1), pp.39-118. Hofstede, G. (2002) Cultures consequences: Company values, behaviours, institutions and organizations across nations. 2nd ed. Great Britain: SAGE Publications, Inc. Jensen, M. and Ruback, R.S. (1983) The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 11 (4), pp.5-50. Johnson, G. and Scholes, K. (2000) Exploring corporate strategy. Harlow: Pearson education. Matsumoto, D. (1996) Culture and psychology. CA: Brooke/Cole. Neubauer, F., Steger, U. and Radler, G. (2000) The Daimler/Chrysler merger: The involvement of the boards. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 8 (4), pp.375-387. Pike, R., Neale, B. and Linsley, P.M. (2012) Corporate finance and investment: decisions and strategies. 7th ed. Great Britain: Pearson Education Pritchett, P. (1997) After the merger: The authoritative guide for integration success. Texas: Pritchett and Associates, Inc. Schein, E.H. (2010) Organizational culture and leadership. 4th ed. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Schuler, R and Jackson, S. (2001) HR issues and activities in mergers and acquisitions. European Management Journal, 19 (3), pp. 239-253. Senior, B. and Swailes, S. (2000) Organizational Change. 4th ed. Edinburgh: Pearson Education Limited. Sudarsanam, S. and Mahate, A.A. (2006) Are friendly acquisitions too bad for shareholders and managers? Long term value creation and top management turnover in hostile and friendly acquirers. British Journal of Management, 17 (1), pp.10-17. Tannenbaum, S and Yukl, G. (1992) Training and development in work organizations. Annual Review of Psychology, 43 (2), pp.339-441. T he Economist. (2000) The DaimlerChrysler emulsion. [Online] Available from: https://www.economist.com/node/341352